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Abstract—The goal of an Intrusion Detection is inadequate to detect errors and unusual activity on a network or on the hosts belonging to a 
local network by monitoring network activity. Algorithms for building detection models are broadly classified into two categories, Misuse De-
tection and Anomaly Detection. The proposed approach should be taken into account, as the security system violations caused by both in-
compliance with the security policy and attacks on the system resulting in the need to describe models. However, it is based on unif ied ma-
thematical formalism which is provided for subsequent merger of the models. The above formalism in this paper presents a state machine 
describing the behavior of a system subject. The set of intrusion description models is used by the evaluation module and determines the 
likelihood of undesired actions the system is capable of detecting. The number of attacks which are not described by models determining the 
completeness of detection by the IDS linked to the ability of detecting security violations. 
 
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection, Misuse Detection, Anomaly Detection,  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
Software still suffers from vulnerabilities that allow at-
tackers to gain illicit access to computer systems. Attack-
ers exploit vulnerabilities to hijack control of a process’ 
execution as a means to access or alter a system as they 
desire. Intrusion detection system are software and/or 
hardware components that monitor computer systems 
and analyze events occurring in them for signs of intru-
sions. Due to widespread diversity and complexity of 
computer infrastructures, it is difficult to provide a com-
pletely secure computer system. Therefore, numerous 
security systems and intrusion detection systems that 
address different aspects of computer security. The de-
sign and construction of host-based intrusion detection 
systems is an active research area. Several papers in the 
intrusion detection have been published in the past 
[8],[9],[10]. However, the growth of the field has been 
very rapid, and many new ideas have emerged ever since 
these systems are invented.  
 
1.1 Classification of attacks and intrusion 
 
Several taxonomies that were developed later mainly fo-
cused on two issues: (i) categorization of computer mi-
suse (i.e. attacks) and (ii) categorization of the people try-
ing to get unauthorized access to computers (perpetra-
tors), and the objectives and results of these attempts. 
Following are the common type of attacks:  
 
1.1.1 Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: These attacks 
attempt to ''shut down a network, computer, or process; 
or otherwise deny the use of resources or services to au-
thorized users'' [11]. An example of operating system at-
tack is teardrop, in which an attacker exploits a vulnera-
bility of the TCP/IP fragmentation re-assembly code that 
do not properly handle overlapping IP fragments by 
sending a series of overlapping packets that are frag-
mented. Typical example of networking DoS attack is a 
"SYN flood" attack. In this attack, attacker establishes a 
large number of "half-open" connections using IP spoof-
ing. Other examples of DoS attacks include disrupting 
connections between machines thus preventing access to 
a service, preventing particular individuals from access-
ing a service, disrupting service to a specific system or 
person, etc. In distributed DoS (DDoS) attack, which is an 
advanced variation of DoS attack, multiple machines are 
deployed to attain this goal. DoS and DDoS attacks have 
posed an increasing threat to IDS and techniques to 
thwart them have become an active research area 
[12],[17],[18],[19]. 
 
1.1.2 Probing attacks: These attacks scan the net-
works to identify valid IP addresses and to collect infor-
mation about them (e.g. what services they offer, operat-
ing system used). These attacks are probably the most 
common ones, and are usually precursor to other attacks. 
Examples of probing attacks include IPsweep (scanning 
the network computers for a service on a specific port of 
interest), portsweep (scanning through many ports to 
determine which services are supported on a single host), 
nmap (tool for network mapping), etc. 
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1.1.3 R2L (Remote to Local) attacks:   Where an 
attacker who has the ability to send packets to a machine 
over a network, gains access to the machine. In most R2L 
attacks, the attacker breaks into the computer system via 
the Internet. Typical examples of R2L attacks include 
guessing passwords (e.g. guest and dictionary attacks) 
and gaining access to computers by exploiting software 
vulnerability.  
 
1.1.4 U2R ( User to root ) attacks: Where an attacker 
who has an account on a computer system is able to mi-
suse/elevate her or his privileges by exploiting a vulne-
rability in computer mechanisms, a bug in the operating 
system or in a program that is installed on the system. 
Unlike R2L attacks, where the hacker breaks into the sys-
tem from the outside, in U2R compromise, the local user 
attacker is already in the system and typically becomes a 
root or a user with higher privileges. The most common 
U2R attack is buffer overflow.  
 
1.2 Host-Based IDS 
 
Host based intrusion detection systems analyze users  
activities and behavior on a given machine. However, 
depending upon the processing performed; host-based 
IDSs can significantly impact the performance of the ma-
chine they are running on. In addition, audit sources used 
in host-based intrusion analysis, can be easily modified 
by a successful attack, which represents another limita-
tion of host-based IDSs. In order to eradicate these draw-
backs, host-based IDSs have to process the audit trail suf-
ficiently fast to be able to raise alarms before an attacker 
has an opportunity to observe and/or modify the audit 
trail or the intrusion-detection system itself. There are 
several types of information that are typically used in 
host-based IDSs, e.g. (i) system commands, (ii) system 
accounting, (iii) syslog and (iv) security audit informa-
tion. Automated detectors find attacks without human 
interaction. The goal of automated detection is to maxim-
ize the number of actual attacks discovered while mini-
mizing the number of false alarms. 
 
1.2.1 System commands: System commands are a 
useful source of information that can be employed by 
host based IDSs for detecting malicious users [20],[21]. By 
analyzing system commands that users invoke in their 
sessions, it is possible to build user profiles, which de-
scribe users' characteristics and common behavior. 
 
1.2.2 System Accounting: System accounting is 
present in both Windows and Unix operating systems. 
Although the interest for system accounting in Windows 
environment is increasing, there have not been many in-
trusion detection approaches that used this type of data 
for intrusion analysis [7].  
 
1.2.3 System log information: System log data con-
tains information that is not available at the network lev-
el, such as when users log in, when they send email, who 
they send email to, which ftp logs commands are issued, 
and which files are transferred. One of the major draw-
backs of using syslog information for intrusion detection 
is that syslog information is not very secure, since several 
syslog daemons exhibit buffer overflow exploitation [6]. 
 
1.2.4 Security audit processing: The security audit 
trails represent records that contain all potentially impor-
tant activities related to the security of the system. In ad-
dition, advantages of using security audit data include 
strong user authentication, easier audit system configura-
tion, and fine-grain parameterization of collected infor-
mation [4]. Several research groups [2],[3] have been ac-
tively using security audit trails mainly for host-based 
intrusion detection systems. The focus of their research 
has been mainly to define what information the security 
audit trail should contain in order to increase the IDS 
prediction performance as well as to establish an accepta-
ble common format for audit trail records. 
 
1.3 Misuse vs Anomaly Detection  
 
Many contemporary IDSs integrate both approaches to 
benefit from their respective advantages [5],[16]. 
 
1.3.1 Misuse Detection: Misuse detection is the most 
common approach used in the current generation of 
commercial intrusion detection systems (IDSs).  
 Signature-based techniques: In signature-based IDSs, 
monitored events are matched against a database of at-
tack signatures to detect intrusions. In addition, once a 
new attack is discovered and its signature is developed, 
often there is a substantial latency in its deployment 
across networks [1]. 
 
 Rule-based systems: Rule-based systems use a set of 
"if-then" implication rules to characterize computer at-
tacks. In rule-based IDSs, security events are usually mo-
nitored and then converted into the facts and rules that 
are later used by an inference engine to draw conclusions. 
 
 State transition analysis: Intrusion detection using 
state transition analysis requires the construction of a fi-
nite state machine, in which states correspond to different 
IDS states, and transitions characterize certain events that 
cause IDS states to change. Every time when the automa-
tion reaches a state that is flagged as a security threat, the 
intrusion is reported as a sign of malicious attacker activi-
ty. 
 
1.3.2 Anomaly Detection: Increase in the number of 
computer attacks, in their severity and complexity has 
raised substantial interest in anomaly detection algo-
rithms due to their potential for recognizing unforeseen 
and emerging cyber activities.  
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2. IDS Architecture 
 
It is very important that the security mechanisms of a 
system are designed so as to prevent unauthorized access 
to system resources and data. Regardless of the type of 
IDS there are a few common components that typically 
constitute an IDS:  
2.1 Traffic Collector: The component is responsible 
for gathering activity and event data for analysis. On a 
host-based IDS this will typically include metrics such as 
inbound and outbound traffic and activity recorded by 
the operating system in log and audit files.[5]  
2.2 Analysis Engine: The analysis engine is 
responsible for analyzing the data gathered by the traffic 
collector. In case of a knowledge-based IDS the data will 
compared against a signature database.  
2.3 Signature Database: Used in knowledge-based 
systems, the signature database contains a collection of 
signatures known to be associated with suspicious and 
malicious activities. It could be said that a knowledge 
based IDS is only as good as its database.  
2.4 Management Interface: A management interface 
providing a mechanism by which system administrators 
may manage the system and receive alerts when 
intrusions are detected. 
A host-based IDS runs directly on a server or desktop 
system and uses the resources of that system to examine 
log and audit files together with network traffic entering 
and leaving the system. A false positive is legitimate and 
authorized activity on a system which is incorrectly 
identified by an IDS as being suspicious or malicious. By 
running directly on the host and analyzing log files in 
context with overall system activity the number of false 
positives is reduced.   
3. Development of the Analysis Module 
This article offers the description of an approach to status 
security analysis aimed at detecting information security 
violations in the course of computer system operation. 
The online system condition monitoring subsystem 
should detect system transfers to unsafe condition due to 
intrusions into the system. Hence, the task of online sys-
tem status security monitoring consists in: 
i) Detecting the conditions that contradict to the security policy 
determined in the system 
ii) Identifying the reasons that caused an insecure condition of the 
system; 
iii) Evaluating the security of the system being intruded. 
 
The approach proposed should take into account security 
system violations caused by both incompliance with the 
security policy and attacks on the system resulting in the 
need to describe models[15].  
 
 
3.1 Identification of System Model for  
Security breach 
 
Let us introduce definitions of the concepts to be used in 
further reasoning. {Sb}–a huge amount of subjects ;{Obj}–a 
huge amount of objects; {Opt} – a massive amount of op-
erations; {Pgs} – a massive amount of  services used by 
the programs or program interfaces. The introduction of 
this huge amount into the system model description is 
due to the fact that system subject operations over objects 
are implemented using services. Hence the matrix of sub-
ject to object access in the system may be defined as fol-
lows: Mc’ (Sb, Pgs, Obj) – access matrix for programs used 
on behalf of subjects to perform operations with system 
objects. 
Then machine A = { , t, Output, 0,δ, λ } which represents 
the user performance with respect to the security policy 
determined in the system, may be described as follows:     
= {Opt1(prog1, 01), …, Optj(progj, 0j)} – a machine state 
describing operations performed by a system subject over 
objects; the huge amount of condition is partially rank-
ordered. t Є Opt(Pgsj, ok) – controlling machine symbols 
corresponding to the operations performed by the subject 
over system objects using programs. A secure status is a 
condition describing operations performed by the subject 
that do not violate to the security policy. Thus the condi-
tion security evaluation describes the machine exit as 
Output = {Secure, UnSecure}. The machine completes its 
operation if it goes to an unsafe condition. Then the tran-
sition function δ may be described as follows: 
 
t = Optj  Optj(progj, 0j) Є j = t → = j 
t = Optj !  Optj(progj, 0j) Є j = t →= j U t 
 
The exit function of machine λ may be presented as fol-
lows: 
t = Optj (Optj(progj, 0j) Є j ) (Optj(progj, 0j) Є Mc’ (Sb, 
Pgs, o)) →Output = Secure 
t = Opt (Optj(progj, 0j) Є j) V(Optj(progj, 0j)Є Mc’(Sb , 
Pgs, o)) →Output = UnSecure 
3.2 Detection Model 
Let us discuss a model describing likely system attacks. 
System attacks are identified with the use of attack signa-
tures {Signtn} M 
              n=1        
The massive amount of signatures describing attacks may 
be grouped into submultitudes according to their PROP-
ERTY. The PROPERTY reflects the huge amount of attack 
signatures into multitude prptym m Є 1: N that describes 
the attack objectives. Each element of multitude prptym 
reflects the objectives of an attack involving signatures. 
Multitude  { prptym  }N 
            m=1 
 is partially rank-ordered. It is important that the intruder 
performing intrusion advances in its actions by means of 
launching various attacks on the system. Then the huge 
amount of signatures may be rank-ordered in accordance 
with the intrusion stage as:  
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          k 
{Signtj1}M1    …… {Signtj1}Mk    while ∑ mi=M 
             j1=1   jk=1           i=1 
At that, the scenarios of security violation (intrusion) may 
be described as Scn=(Signt0, Signt1, …, Signtk) k <= M 
provided that: 
1) j, k Є 1: m, j≠k →Signtj ≠ Signtk 
2) j, k Є 1: m, j <= k →prpty (Signtj) ≤ prpty (Signtk) 
 
The machine describing system security violations may 
be introduced using the following definitions: = {Signtn} 
– machine condition described by a signature correspond-
ing to the most advanced intrusion phase reached by the 
intruder. 
t Є Signtj – machine control symbols; prpty( j) for the cur-
rent machine condition – machine exit 
0 Є   – initial condition in which the subject starts inte-
racting with the system. 
 
Machine transition function δ may be described as fol-
lows: 
t = Signtk  Signtj Є j: prpty(Signtk) ≤ prpty(Signtj)→ 
j+1 = j 
 
Output function λ is described as follows: 
t = Signtj Output = prpty (δ ( i , t)). 
3.3 Unified Model 
The components describing the system model may be 
described using a unified structure. In the above structure 
machine condition will be described as follows: σ = 
{{Opt1(prog1,01),…..,Opti(progi,0i)},Signtn(Scnl)}.  
 
The entry of the unified machine is a user-performed op-
eration using a service, or a user-performed system attack 
using a service. Hence, t Є (Opt(Pgsj, ok) V Signtn) – ma-
chine control symbols. Transfer function δ of the unified 
machine is described as follows: 
 
t = Signtk  Signtj  Є j : prpty (Signtk)<=prpty(Signtj )  → 
j+1 = j 
t = Signtk !  Signtj Є j : prpty  (Signtk)<=prpty(Signtj )  
→ j+1 = j U Signtj 
t=Optj  Optj(progj, 0j) Є j =t → j+1 = j                 
t=Optj !  Optj(progj, 0j) Є j =t → j+1= j U t 
The machine exit is the unified machine condition profile. 
In accordance with the above definitions the condition 
may be: safe, unsafe and attack condition. The exit func-
tion of the unified machine λ is described as follows: 
t= Signtj Output=prpty(δ ( i , t)) 
t= Optj (Optj(progj, 0j) Є j ) V (Optj(progj, 0j) Є Mc’ (Sb, 
Pgs, o)) → Output = Secure 
t=Optj (Optj(progj,0j)Є j) V(Optj(progj,0j) not member 
of Mc’ (Sb, Pgs,o))→Output = UnSecure 
Therefore, this article offers a machine model providing 
for online monitoring of system condition security. Based 
on online monitoring of system condition security various 
security violations of the computer system may be de-
tected. 
4. Development features of the 
Acquisition Module 
The attacks and intrusions themselves are commonly de-
scribed as in lower level terms. The bridging of this gap 
should be facilitated by an adequate data acquisition me-
thod with an option to transform the data obtained to 
higher presentation levels. Even though for data acquisi-
tion in host-based IDS it is possible to use standard tools 
of operating system audits it is advisable to customize the 
data acquisition modules due to the fact that standard 
audit tools frequently acquire information useless for de-
tecting system security violations while vital information 
is often missing. The level selection will be determined by 
two contradictory factors – the ease of information acqui-
sition and the unambiguous decision-making process. 
Function Level(Mk)= {LevModm} provides for the return of 
the level huge amount of operation and object descrip-
tions used to describe intrusion model j. Let us assume 
that a acquisition module gathers data at level LevData. 
Let us designate the presentation of system objects and 
operations at the level of the acquisition module as OpLev-
Data, PrLevData, and at the model level as OpLevMod, PrLevMod. 
Thereafter the proposed system will make it possible to 
describe the basic properties of the IDS determined by the 
data acquisition module. 
 
1) Validity of the intrusion detection system. The data ac-
quisition module should run at a minimum level of oper-
ation and object presentation present in a multitude of 
models describing attacks Mk LevData ≤ 
min(min(LevMod(Mk))) . In the event that the above con-
dition is not met the data acquisition module will not be 
capable of transferring complete information to the sys-
tem event analysis module, and the operation of the IDS 
will be invalid. 
 
2) Compatibility of the modules of the IDS. The data ob-
tained by the data acquisition module of the host-based 
IDS should be reduced to a single format used by the 
analysis module of the intrusion detection system  Mk ! 
F,G:OpLevMod=F(OpLevData),PrLevData= G(PrLevData).The 
existence of single transformations F and G and their 
complexity determine the possibility to identify objects 
and operations at the level of intrusion model presenta-
tion as well as the complexity of development. 
 
3) Compatibility of the IDS with the computer system. 
Ideally, the intrusion detection system should be transpa-
rent for the user. However, a module developed after 
such a pattern may prove inefficient because the volume 
of data acquired for analysis may be redundant. The use 
of data acquired on the events in a particular subsystem 
may be appropriate from the perspective of detecting 
subsystem attacks which limits system. Thus, a hit-hit 
option would provide for tracking the subsystem events 
that are critical for the system security. In accordance 
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with the requirements the modification of the software 
environment may impact the compatibility of the data 
acquisition module with the computer system. As a re-
sult, it is recommended to use the intrusion detection sys-
tem without modifying the software environment or us-
ing modification of environment variables. As shown 
above, the choice of performance level for the data acqui-
sition module, in its turn, has an impact on the validity of 
IDS and the compatibility of its modules. At that, it is 
most appropriate to develop modules for acquisition of 
the data related to the intercept of system calls and API 
requests. Table 1 shows a comparison of the most com-
mon methods used to build a data acquisition module for 
Windows OS family host-based IDS. The number of mod-
els used and reduces the wholeness of the intrusion detec-
tion. It should be noted that the values shown in the 
above table for different relative features with respect to 
the method used for building a data acquirement module 
for host-based IDS, will be typical of not only Windows 
OS but of other operating systems too. The most promis-
ing methods for building a data acquisition component 
should be the method based on the intercept of system 
calls, Performance tools and the method based on the use 
of OS drivers. The use of methods based on the intercept 
of system calls is less lengthy compared to the method 
based on the use of OS drivers. However the use of me-
thods based on the intercept of system calls requires 
strong efforts aiming at ensuring protectibility compared 
to the methods based on the use of OS drivers. As it fol-
lows from Table 1, the methods based on the intercept of 
system calls may also suffer from problems related to the 
requirement regarding protectibility. The methods based 
on the performance tools may also have deficiencies re-
garding the transparency of the user and the analysis of 
the system operation. 
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High degree of 
information contents 
     
Ability to acquire 
info 
     
Methods of attack 
detection 
     
Anomaly detection 
methods 
     
Analysis of system 
operation 
     
Versatility      
Transparency for 
user 
     
User-free info 
acquisition 
     
Protectibilty      
Table: Methods used to build a Data Acquisition Model 
5. Conclusion 
Thus, in this paper we’ve tried to find out the bal-
ance between intellectuality and usability of host-
based IDS. Our algorithm of detection is efficient 
and communicative and can be used in practical 
IDS with different perspective. As OS drivers 
have more efficiency with less audit feature for 
attack detection and less protectibility for system 
calls.Whilst host-based intrusion detection 
systems work well for deployment on smaller 
numbers of systems i.e the tracking, monitoring 
and maintaining of hundreds or thousands of 
systems can quickly become a cumbersome 
overhead in terms of costs and resources. Pro-
posed model makes it possible to justify the selec-
tion of the method for building a data acquisition 
module of host-based IDS. 
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